

1959

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959

SPEECH
OF

HON. LEONARD G. WOLF

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 3, 1959

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 8678) to amend the Federal-Aid Highway Acts of 1956 and 1958 to make certain adjustments in the Federal-aid highway program, and for other purposes.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I feel that I must point out some facts regarding my protest vote against the 1-cent-a-gallon increase in the gas tax. By closing off debate and not allowing amendments on the question of where we are going to get money to pay for the highway program, the American people lost and the special interests won. I want it clearly understood that I am in favor of the continuation of the interstate highway program. I am opposed to the procedure by which it became impossible to discuss on the floor of Congress the method of financing it.

Many Members of Congress were in support of alternative methods of taxation to the one proposed. The 1-cent-a-gallon tax increase will injure many people in very modest circumstances who consider gasoline a necessity for their livelihood. It is my feeling that Congress should have considered an amendment to the gas tax bill which would have reduced the 27½ percent oil depletion allowance for foreign oil imports. The Members of the Congress were aware that such an amendment was to be introduced by Congressman HENRY REUSS, of Wisconsin, had amendments been in order. This would have saved the American taxpayers millions of dollars and thus provided us with \$2.4 billion necessary to finance our interstate highway program. If the Congress had supported a plan which would have reduced the oil depletion allowance from 27½ to 15 percent, the gasoline tax would not have had to be raised and the little taxpayer would not be hurt.

I am very sorry that one of the true beneficiary groups of the new highway system, the billion-dollar oil companies, are able to escape the tax burden which other people, not in oil, have to pay.

Another interesting paradox is that American foreign aid funds are being used abroad to build highways without an additional gas tax being imposed in those countries, while in America—to finance our own roadbuilding program—we are called irresponsible if we do not immediately impose an additional 1-cent gas tax.

The American people have been sadly misled on the problem of raising the gas tax so that highway construction would continue. The Administration has diverted moneys collected from the Federal highway fund for other purposes. There is at least \$1.2 billion a year which belong in the Federal highway fund

which is not getting there. Furthermore, there is no reason why, if taxes must be raised in this area, we must exclude taxing the fat oil companies by continuing to give them tax advantage after tax advantage while the average American must carry a heavier tax burden.

MR. BARKSTEN F.R.
Author of Captive Nations' Week Resolution Points Way To Defeat Russian Cold-War Strategy and Tactics

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 4, 1959

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, as most Members of Congress know, the individual who initiated and authored the Captive Nations' Week resolution is Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, a professor in Soviet economics at Georgetown University. In addition to his academic preoccupations, Dr. Dobriansky serves as 1 of the 44 constituting the membership of the Republican committee on program and progress.

In connection with the Captive Nations' resolution, it was my happy experience, Mr. Speaker, to encourage the efforts of Dr. Dobriansky by submitting the resolution in the House. The total effectiveness of the resolution, now Public Law 86-90, was demonstrated by the violent outbursts it produced in Moscow.

There can be no question of the fact that the resolution struck the nerve center of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism. The paramount reason why Mr. Khrushchev was deeply disturbed by the resolution is due to the fact that for the first time our Government recognizes in this law the existence of the majority of the captive nations which exist in the Soviet Union itself.

If we press this vital point forward, Russia itself will be made to look rather weak. Without the captive resources of the Baltic nations, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, and the other captive non-Russian nations listed in the resolution, Russia itself would assume its real form as a third-rate power. It is this penetrating point that struck Mr. Khrushchev between the eyes. For it is this point which can, psychologically and propagandawise, prick the bloated balloon of Moscow's bluish propaganda concerning the solidity of its military power, economic strength, science, and the like.

Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, August 30, the New York Times ran an editorial on "Lessons From Laos." The editorial warns that we have no apparatus to deal with the well-known Communist techniques of infiltration, subversion, and guerrilla fighting. These same techniques were used about 40 years ago to

destroy the independence of most of the non-Russian nations now in the legalized prison house of nations known as the Soviet Union. Clearly, it would seem that it is high time we developed means to meet this permanent cold-war challenge.

Closely related to the resolution he initiated, an article titled "A Measure of Realism in the Cold War" has been written by Dr. Dobriansky to show the avenues open to us for a successful counteraction and even victory in the cold war. This article, which appeared in the June issue of the Ukrainian Quarterly, advances the practicable means toward a solution to the problem raised by the New York Times editorial.

Because of the grave importance of this problem and the keen interest of our Members in the thought given to it, I have requested that the New York Times editorial and the article written by Dr. Dobriansky be appended to my remarks.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 30, 1959]

LESSONS FROM LAOS

The situation in Laos is proving, once more, that the free world has given inadequate attention to its means of defense against the Communist conspiracy. Communist raiding parties have now struck within 16 miles of the capital. At least three areas in the northern part of the country are already under Communist control or in a state of chaos. The survival of free government in this newly independent kingdom is at stake.

Laos is a member of the United Nations, but the Secretary General admits that he is powerless. He cannot even send in observers unless they are requested by both sides in the controversy and naturally the last thing in the world that the Communists want is observation. The United Nations cannot take any forceful and immediate action without the authority of the Security Council where the Communist veto is expected, automatically.

The United States, acting independently, has announced its intention to airlift some small arms and ammunition to the tiny Lao Army. It may be possible to bring its effectives up from 25,000 to 29,000 men, to withstand the assault of North Vietnam and Red China, whose manpower and firepower are not under such modest limitations.

Even that little bit of help is joyfully welcomed by the free Lao as a symbol of the fact that at least someone, somewhere in the world, is concerned over their survival. And naturally it has drawn a prompt and bitter denunciation from the Communists in North Vietnam on the ground that "U.S. imperialists are seeking to expand the civil war in Laos into a real shooting war." This is no time for humor, but one may be forgiven a wry smile at the concern of foreign Communist North Vietnam over a civil war in Laos.

What all this demonstrates is that we have not yet developed any effective techniques for meeting the by now well known Communist tactics. We don't want a big war and the Communists know it. So they can keep up this unremitting process of hacking away at human liberties, knowing that the United Nations is powerless and that most members wish to keep the peace.

Some changes in the mechanism of keeping the peace and preserving human liberties are obviously needed. Perhaps the first change that is required is in our own thinking so that we can recognize a grave menace

when it appears, and not shrug it off lightly because it happens to be on the other side of the world.

[From the Ukrainian Quarterly, June 1959]

A MEASURE OF REALISM IN THE COLD WAR

(By Lev E. Dobriansky)

How to cope with the cold war thrusts and maneuvers of Moscow has been a fundamental and vexing problem for some time. By no means has the problem in any real sense been resolved. In fact, our Government has not faced up squarely to all the demands and issues involved in the problem. As a consequence, no clear-cut decision has been made on how to meet it, no apparatus or coordinating body exists at present to adequately deal with it, and our dearth of operation could only accommodate a defensive reaction, based on military might, to the successive challenges posed by Moscow. In each instance, some gain of a psychopolitical nature accrues to the enemy. This could not be otherwise since our defensive posture can only serve to minimize, not prevent entirely, his inroads into the broad field of operation offered by the free world.

The problem is not one that can be competently and satisfactorily handled by any existing executive agency. Moscow's cold war activity embraces military factors, to be sure, but much of the bluster, bluff, and blackmail built about U.S.S.R.'s military prowess plainly indicate that in this context the military is essentially a tool for the furtherance of broader political and psychological objectives. This dimension does not fall as an object of primary study, not to mention operation, in our Military Establishment. As another example, Moscow's unleashing of economic warfare against the free world creates a similar dimension in its cold war activity. Now the economic tool is utilized to achieve the same psychopolitical objectives. Our Departments of Commerce and State are properly concerned with these economic penetrations into the free world. But the most that one can hope for in either Department is a subsidiary study of this phase of the problem. The same may be said for the propaganda and information phase, cultural exchange, education, science, and other fields of enterprise in the cold war. Studies will continue to be piecemeal, interest in one aspect or another will fluctuate in response to the tune played by Moscow, and much of the effort and capital invested in these lines will yield less than maximally productive results for want of central purpose and efficient coordination.

If, somewhat inaccurately, one dates the beginning of the cold war period as 1947, the picture depicted above is not a pretty one. The picture is scarcely exaggerated; if anything, it is incomplete. After over a decade of experience with cold war activity, we find ourselves still stripped of the necessary means to engage intelligently and competently in it. Recently, some legislators on the House Appropriations Committee were amazed to receive a State Department request for funds to establish a section for the purpose of studying Communist tactics and techniques. As one of them pointed out, he was under the natural impression all these years that appropriations made along these lines were being continuously applied to this primary and necessary end. The obvious moral here is that in these matters one should not be guided by natural impressions and, effect, take things for granted. As a matter of fact, if the Department had actually conducted such continuous studies, there is little likelihood that they would have assumed any concrete operational significance and the problems of coordination and forming a composite picture of Russian cold war operation would still remain unsolved.

There are numerous reasons accounting for this present state of affairs. For one, the nature and scope of cold war activity continue to elude the understanding of many Americans. Some, pitiful in their grasp of Russia's historical background, view it as part of a "strange new force"—that has entered our world—"the strangest and most enigmatic in all history."¹ When, for instance, Khrushchev makes a warm actor's plea for the lessening of international tensions, they find it difficult to understand that this gesture is only another purposeful maneuver in Moscow's cold war operation. The zag—after the zig—is nothing new in Russia (not just in the so-called Soviet) history, and the end has both political and psychological import. Americans naturally crave for real peace. When it suits the calculations of their next operational move, the Russians are prepared to soothe this popular craving. The process misleads, confuses, softens, and gains time and advantage for a concurrent or subsequent move. Moscow's controlled cultural exchange program and recourse to economic aid and competition play on additional American instincts, with much the same results. Even the conduct of diplomatic negotiation is for Moscow a traditional cold war instrument. But many of our leaders, steeped in Western traditions, continue to believe that a high level conference with the Russians in an appropriate occasion for settling differences of view on particular issues.

Another reason for our lack of a cold war apparatus is the expressed distaste Americans have for Russian methods and techniques. It is frequently argued that we could not succumb to the use of such methods. The filth of lies, distortions, callous murders, and general immoral behavior is beyond our political upbringing. Thus we must depend upon our standard ways. In reply one could say that in a hot war we don't hesitate to employ any ruse or means of killing where it serves the end of our survival and self-preservation. Why should we be so discriminating under conditions of neither peace nor war, however, that to overwhelm the Russian cold war threat a condescension to such methods is not necessary. We possess powers of truth and knowledge that are not being fully used for want of organization and implemental zeal and imagination. In short, we haven't as yet developed an efficient apparatus for the utilization of these powers in the most effective ways possible.

Differing views as to the administration of a full-fledged cold war undertaking constitute a third reason for the absence of such a vital program. Those having these views are in complete agreement that such a project is a must. To a greater or lesser extent they do disagree with regard to its content. For example, this writer sees nothing really new in the cold war techniques and methods of the Russian Communists. There is nothing peculiarly Communist about them. Except for accidental variations of refinement and intensity, the substantive content of these techniques was provided by Russian totalitarianism politics as far back as the 16th century. These tools are the key to an understanding of Moscow's phenomenal creation of a vast empire long before Lenin and the Bolsheviks appeared on the scene. However, this perspective awaits expression and treatment once our facilities are adequately established. The newness of these techniques rests in the fact that Americans never encountered them before. For East Europeans of the traditionally subjugated nations, these are historically old methods.

¹ Eg., "What We Must Know About Communism," by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, 1958, p. 9.

Many recent voicings that something creative and different must be done clearly indicate a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with existing agencies on this score. Senator Jackson, of Washington, soundly declared at the recent Military Government Association meeting in Washington that "We have been outmaneuvered politically in one vital area after another." He is right when he avers that "we have never been in the same league with the Russians in the psychological war of wits and words." The writer, David Lawrence, began his illuminating column recently with these words: "What a spectacle the Western governments are making of themselves these days as they flounder indecisively, in the midst of Soviet threats and ultimatums, seemingly afraid to meet squarely the challenging issues of the hour." Senate Majority Leader LYNDON JOHNSON gives further expression to this growing restlessness as concerns our operational inadequacies when he urges the calling of a summit of the heads of state of the free world.

These and many more evidences simply show that the requirements and demands of the current situation are not and cannot be met by our existing agencies. They are functionally fitted for other respective ends. This does not mean, of course, that with a new agency, created for the specific purpose of dealing with the realities of cold war operation, the fringe efforts of the existing departments would not be embraced. On the contrary, for policymaking reasons, a close coordination would be mandatory.

THE FREEDOM COMMISSION MEASURE

The measure of realism in the cold war is the measure now before Congress, known as the Freedom Commission Act. This measure is sponsored in the House by Congressman HERLONG, of Florida, and Judd, of Minnesota. In the Senate its sponsors are Senators MUNDT, of South Dakota, and DOUGLAS, of Illinois. The measure calls for the creation of a Freedom Commission, the establishment of a Freedom Academy, and the formation of a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee. Its basic idea was first advanced several years ago by the Select House Committee To Investigate Communist Aggression which was led by the Honorable Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin. Two years ago Senator DOUGLAS sponsored a bill seeking this very Freedom Commission. The immediate stimulus given to the present measure was provided by a Florida group called the Orlando Committee for the Freedom Academy.

The bill is designed to provide much-needed facilities for the strengthening of our cold war position. As its objectives imply, it would correct the glaring inadequacy that exists in our executive realm. The Freedom Commission it seeks to create would be an independent agency composed of six members and a Chairman. The members and Chairman would be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. One of the prime authorized functions of the Commission would be the establishment and supervision of the Freedom Academy training at the Academy would concentrate on knowledge of Russian Communist techniques and ways and means of counteracting them. Students would be carefully drawn from governmental, private, and even foreign areas. Other functions of the Commission include the establishment of an information center to aid all groups in an understanding of the Russian Communist conspiracy, the conduct of research and surveys, and a host of additional tasks aimed to realize the objectives of the act. The Joint Congressional Freedom Committee, consisting of seven Senators and seven Congressmen, would oversee the work and development of the Commission.

There is no question that this measure realistically fills in some serious gaps in our Government when it comes to this subject of

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cold war preparation. The bill should definitely and overwhelmingly be passed. Its passage would be one of the crowning achievements of this Congress. Beyond a question of doubt there is no educational institution in our Government or in the private area that can be compared with the contemplated Freedom Academy. Second, no existing executive agency is equipped by administrative bent or facility to undertake the functions prescribed for the Freedom Commission. And third, since cold war progress is just as important and vital—if in the long run not more so—as atomic progress, the need for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee is well satisfied by this bill.

THE BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURE

This measure of realism in the cold war has a broader significance than an actual reading of it would suggest. First, it should be borne in mind that it isn't impossible for this country, and with it the free world, to suffer disastrous defeat at the hands of the present Russian Empire. The possibility of such defeat is not necessarily grounded in any precondition of a hot global war. As a matter of historical fact, the great advances in the expansion of the Russian Empire, both past and present, were achieved primarily through diplomatic duplicity and conspiracy rather than military means. Thus, if the defeat of the United States should come to pass, the increasing chances are that this tragic eventuation would not be the result of lapsed missile production, any technologic lags, deficiency in conventional arms, retarded space exploration, domestic economic difficulties, or a fictitious economic victory by Moscow. As one speculates with balanced weighting of each of these he cannot but conclude that this possible defeat would be the consequence of a stubborn misunderstanding of the traditional nature of the enemy, how he grew to be what he is, and the trained cunning of his diplomatic, political, economic, and conspiratorial ways and techniques. With the well-grounded projection that our deterrent power in military means will be of declining importance over the long run, the soundness of the preceding observation becomes even more striking.

If the estimate arrived at above is correct, then the significance and indispensable value of the Freedom Commission come into full view for the precarious period ahead. To live up to its expectations, the Commission would have to probe into one of the strangest phenomena characterizing America's role in international politics. In this country, strangely enough, with all its rich traditions of freedom, national independence, and principled opposition to colonialism and imperialism, the real chasm that exists between imperialist Russian totalitarianism and freedom-aspiring non-Russian nationalism seems to escape the minds of many, including many on the highest levels of Government. In these cases, which perhaps are far too numerous than the present critical situation can tolerate, it appears that their deficiency of knowledge concerning Russia qua Russia is exceeded only by their lack of insight into the traditional spirituality and living revolution of our own Nation. Well exemplifying this was the Mikoyan exhibition in this country at the beginning of this year. Fortunately, however, this inexcusable condition is being steadily, though slowly, overcome by various contributions made in this field at our universities and in group action. The basic force of Russian totalitarian imperialism and colonialism would necessarily be a high priority item for the Commission.

UNUSED POWERS OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

As mentioned earlier, the argument of submission to the filth of Russian totalitar-

ian behavior is grossly untenable. With honorable means and techniques the Commission can begin to utilize some of our unused powers of knowledge and truth to inflict severe damage upon Moscow's cold war campaign. In this respect its first area would be domestic. There is an intricate labyrinth of false preconceptions and disinformation concerning Russia and the U.S.S.R. and their relations to the United States. Doubtlessly, this cannot be dissolved in short order. Time, patience, and persistent effort are required. Not only an educational but a historical process is involved. This field of knowledge seems to excel all others in this country in confusion, misunderstanding, and even unpardonable ignorance. In its pursuit of objective studies the Commission would inevitably have to consider whether communism or imperialist Russian totalitarianism is a reality, whether the U.S.S.R. can be identified as any other state, whether—all sentimentalism aside—Russians can in any decisive manner be attracted to the responsibilities of freedom while the empire of their capital is maintained. These and other basic issues would have to be sufficiently clarified by the Commission if we are to adopt those approaches to techniques, via understanding, that would incisively penetrate and weaken the present Russian empire.

This first step would be the heaviest and at the same time most constructive responsibility of the Commission. In the order of first things first, unless we begin to rectify our own imbred misconceptions, we can't help but perpetuate old errors. For example, in this field of knowledge the failure of many scholars and writers to comprehend the empire character of the Soviet Union has led to all sorts of distorted and slanted observations. In the military sciences, for instance, the armed forces of the Soviet Union are erroneously viewed as nationally integrated units similar to those of Japan, Germany, and other true nations. Nothing could be further from the truth. In science and the arts, because of demographic ignorance contributions emanating from the Soviet Union are flippantly and uncritically characterized as Russian products. In the field of economics marked by ill-adapted symbols of GNP and the like, treatises are developed on the fallacious assumption that the Soviet Union is a national parallel to the United States. In many other fields the same basic errors of concept and interpretation crop up. In short, the actual is scarcely penetrated to grasp the real: the superficial is accepted in preference to the essential. For purposes of meaningful interpretation and action, the Commission, if it is to achieve a balanced coverage of the enemy and his techniques of deception, would necessarily have to consider alternative frameworks of analytic reference than that presently used.

This first step could not be constructively undertaken without the simultaneous development of the whole area of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. This area of study would have to be developed economically, politically, historically, and culturally. The cultivation of such study, which is virtually nil in this country, will undoubtedly produce many interesting results for perspective and policy alike. One important result is that both out of ignorance as to the nature of the non-Russian revolution in the crumbling Russian empire and out of halfhearted determination, the United States failed to support the ideas and principles of our own tradition in concrete application to independent Georgia, Armenia,

White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkistan, and other non-Russian nations which determined themselves at the end of World War I. These nations were soon again individually subverted and subjugated by the imperialist successors to the White Czar. But the manifest significance of this period rests in the fact that the Russian Communists built upon this failure and our mistakes of 40 years ago and now threaten the very life of our own Nation. What should have been a second- or third-rate power is today, largely on the basis of accumulated captive resources, a contender for the world. More ironical still is the fact that the sole real imperialist power in the world today has actually stolen the American banner of the idea of national self-determination and freedom and successfully parades it in Asia and Africa. Plainly, then, the Freedom Commission in its positive concern for freedom everywhere would be morally obligated to launch systematic studies of this long neglected and yet vitally strategic non-Russian area of the Soviet Union.

THE PROSPECT OF REDRESSING A SAD RECORD

In addition to its broader significance and suggested opportunities, the Freedom Commission, should it come to pass, would have the tremendous prospect of working to redress somewhat the sad record of American relations with Russia. Whether one appreciates it or not, the success of contemporary totalitarian Russian imperialism have been imposing and sweeping. These successes from 1918 to the present provide a concrete measure of fault and incompetence on our side. In the 1920's, soon after our contribution by indifference to the establishment of the new Russian Empire, we inadvertently saved the Russian Bolshevik regime by our charities through the American Relief Administration. In the thirties we furnished industrial know-how and capital to the empire, and soon thereafter cloaked the new imperial regime with the respectable bonds of diplomatic concourse. In the forties we spent billions to save Stalin and overlooked our own determining power in virtually allowing the Russians to expand their empire to the Danube and the China Sea. Our naive faith in Russian word and intention accommodated the leakage of the most vital atomic and missile secrets, and in this decade we witnessed the evaporation of our monopoly power. Finally, our ill-advised participation in the Geneva summit conference built up the international prestige of Stalin's criminal successors who are today strengthened by the sputnik, lunik, and intercontinental missiles. Regardless of the rationalization offered for each of these developments, the record is a sad and almost incredible one.

A midwestern professional friend of the writer has suggested as a title for the past decade of these relations, as concerns the United States: "From Atomic Monopoly and Supreme Air Power To Surrender Research." The pessimistic overtones of the title are not to be accepted, although the elements are factually valid. Yet it cannot be argued that we as a Nation did not lose much in the shortest period of time for any leading power. The reasons for this have in part been given above. There are others. But had there existed all this while an administrative entity comparable to the planned-for Freedom Commission, the results would have been immeasurably different. The nature of the enemy revealed itself decades ago. Nevertheless, to win the cold war means in some notable measure to redress our said record. And the Freedom Commission is purposed to realize such victory.

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September 4

Irrigation and Missouri River Development Important to South Dakota's Future

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GEORGE S. McGOVERN

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 4, 1959

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted that the House Committee on Public Works has approved my resolution instructing the Army engineers to undertake a survey as to the feasibility of slack water navigation on the Missouri River between Yankton, S. Dak., and St. Louis. I believe that such a study will show the desirability of slack water navigation.

It is my conviction that this type of navigation, now in use on the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers and other systems, will provide for the most efficient use of Missouri River water. Instead of wasteful releases of water to maintain the present free-flowing, 9-foot navigation channel, slack water navigation will permit the full development of hydroelectric power and irrigation in the upstream States. Furthermore, it will increase navigation efficiency downstream and add valuable hydroelectric installations to the stretch of the River below Yankton.

Two very fine editorials from outstanding South Dakota newspapers have recently recognized the importance of such a study. I include in the RECORD an editorial from the August 25, 1959, Daily Republic and a second editorial from the September 1, 1959, issue of the Aberdeen American-News:

[From the Mitchell (S. Dak.) Daily Republic, Aug. 25, 1959]

PEOPLE MUST PROVIDE PUSH FOR IRRIGATION

Congressman GEORGE McGOVERN's efforts to clear the way for a study of slack-water navigation on the Missouri River has jumped its first hurdle with the agreement of the Army Corps of Engineers that such a study will provide authoritative and up-to-date data, something that is not available at this time.

The slack-water study was suggested by the Missouri Basin interagency committee at the prodding of South Dakota's Governor Herseeth and the chief executive of the State of Iowa. The proposal is aimed at saving the stored water in mainstem dams for beneficial uses, rather than to dump it downstream for navigation.

This study, if it is approved by Congress, is only one step in seeing that South Dakota retain its rightful amount of the water now flooding thousands of acres that once provided income for individuals, counties and the State. The other steps must be made right here in the State if we do not want to wake up some day and find that it is too late to fill our demands.

The water resources commission this month made the first move in this direction when it organized as a State water conservancy district. This agency was created by the South Dakota Legislature to assist

subconservancy districts to start irrigation projects that will use Missouri River water.

However, there is little the State group can do immediately in the formation of sub-districts. The legislature wisely provided that the support and push for the operating units must come from the people within the district, rather than from a State agency. This is as it should be for these are the people who will benefit most and who also must foot the bill.

The Bureau of Reclamation has been dragging its feet in the major survey of the James River area, partly because of money but mostly because of a lack of organized support for the irrigation project. The same is true in the Charles Mix-Douglas pumping plan which probably could be the first major project if local support can be organized to push through legal channels for the study.

The State water resources commission has been authorized to employ individuals capable of assisting subdistricts in their organization. This should be helpful. But even with this assistance the prime movers must be those residing within the district.

If there is real interest in irrigation on a district, rather than an individual, scale this should be the year to uncover it.

[From the Aberdeen (S. Dak.) American-News, Sept. 1, 1959]

McGOVERN WEIGHS SOUTH DAKOTA WATER NEEDS

It didn't result in as large headlines as his comments on labor legislation, but Representative GEORGE McGOVERN's speech Friday on the urgent need for irrigation was even more important to South Dakota.

The first district Congressman cited at Rapid City the benefits South Dakota can enjoy from irrigation.

Proper use of Missouri River water, he said, will make South Dakota prairies bloom.

What he predicts is certainly true.

Persons who have lived in this State any length of time know that when there is plenty of rain in South Dakota the soil produces with great abundance.

Water, not only for irrigation, is a key to future development—especially in areas such as South Dakota.

Representative McGOVERN's interest in an imaginative water use program should be helpful in completing studies that will hasten expansion of irrigation.

One section in which persons of this part of the State are concerned is the James River Valley. It would be supplied with water from Oahe Dam near Pierre.

Representative McGOVERN, during the same week, made a contribution toward development of another type of water employment. He testified before the House Public Works Committee, urging more efficient development of Missouri River water resources through a survey of slack water navigation possibilities.

He reviewed disadvantages to South Dakota of the current water use program and explained preliminary investigation indicates that instead of "huge, wasteful releases of water necessary to maintain a free-flowing 9-foot channel, a system of slack water navigation would be more beneficial both for navigation interests downstream and the irrigation and power needs of the upstream States."

"A system of low-head dams and locks will trap the water in small stretches of the river, slow down its flow, increase the electric power utilization, and improve the overall benefits of the entire river program for both upstream and downstream States," McGOVERN said.

- U.S. Foreign Policy Revised

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CHARLES O. PORTER

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 3, 1959

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following column by Drew Pearson which appeared in the Friday, September 4, 1959, issue of the Washington Post and Times Herald.

Mr. Pearson, with his usual perspicacity, has cited several interesting changes which recently have taken place, or are taking place, in our foreign policy:

IKE SCRAPPING POLICIES OF DULLES

(By Drew Pearson)

Watching the eminently successful trip of President Eisenhower through Europe, I can't help but recall a historic day in Washington last May when the flag-draped coffin of John Foster Dulles lay in state in the National Cathedral. Foreign ministers from as far as Japan flew to pay their respect and homage. Even dour Andre Gromyko, Dulles' protagonist at many conferences, and gnarled old Chancellor Adenauer, Dulles' friend at many conferences, took the long trip across the Atlantic.

They came because Dulles' friend, the President of the United States, decreed that the Secretary of State should have a state funeral. Mrs. Dulles had planned a quiet family ceremony, but a deeply grieving President personally took charge of all funeral arrangements, even specifying the type of dress to be worn, and preparing the list of honor guests. He wanted the man who had worked so tirelessly to solve the problems of the world to have, in death, the recognition of the world. As a result, not even Presidents Roosevelt, Harding and McKinley, who died in office, were buried with such ceremony.

It was just 2 months and 5 days later that President Eisenhower began scrapping the policies of John Foster Dulles. He would be the last to admit this. And perhaps he didn't even realize he was scrapping Dulles' policies. But he did it first by inviting Nikita Khrushchev of the Kremlin to pay a personal visit to the White House, an invitation which Mr. Dulles had emphatically and consistently opposed unless our rights in Berlin were first guaranteed. They were not guaranteed, but Khrushchev was invited anyway.

Ike went even further by accepting Khrushchev's invitation to come to Moscow, which brought gasps of dismay from close friends of Dulles.

IKK BECOMES A DULLES

Then one by one, the President proceeded to throw overboard or discredit, without specifically naming them or perhaps even realizing that he was doing so, the watchwords and policies of his late Secretary of State. The only policy he kept was that of personal negotiation. Stepping into the Dulles shoes of the traveling-diplomat-salesman, he proceeded to carry his own ideas direct to the trouble spots and troubled statesmen of Europe.

He has been so successful that many diplomats wish the President had become his own Secretary of State long ago. But in so doing, here is what happened to the policies of Mr. Dulles: